


ORIGINAL



No. **83-6092**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Christine Witcover Dean
Counsel for Petitioner
Post Office Box 667
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
(919) 828-9800

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Christine Witcover Dean
Counsel for Petitioner
Post Office Box 667
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
(919) 828-9800

Questions Presented*

- I. WAS PETITIONER DENIED DUE PROCESS AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL BY THE RULE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REQUIRING A CONSOLIDATED BRIEF AND ARGUMENT?
- II. DID THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROVAL OF THE ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATORS STATEMENTS WITHOUT DEFENDANT BEING OTHERWISE CONNECTED TO THE CONSPIRACY CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND OTHER CIRCUITS?
- ✓ III. WAS THE EVIDENCE FROM A FEDERAL WIRETAP BASED ON AN INVALID STATE WIRETAP AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE?
- IV. DID THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION UPHOLDING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS?
- V. WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING?
 - A. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE PRESIDING OVER A POST-TRIAL HEARING AT WHICH HE TESTIFIED DENY PETITIONER AN IMPARTIAL DECISION ON THE JURY TAMPERING ISSUE?

B. WAS PETITIONER DENIED HER RIGHT TO MAKE INQUIRY
INTO THE EXTENT OF JURY CONTAMINATION BY HAVING
ALL JURORS TESTIFY?

VI. WAS PETITIONER DENIED TRIAL BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
JURY?

*The following parties were also listed as defendants
in the proceedings below: Ronald Doyle Hines, Gary J. Peed,
James Maurice Jackson, James C. Coddington, Jeffrey Craig
Bumgardner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Pages</u> |
|--|--------------|
| OPINIONS BELOW..... | 1 |
| JURISDICTION..... | 2 |
| CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES..... | 2 |
| STATEMENT OF CASES..... | 6 |
| REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT..... | 9 |
| I. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL BY THE RULE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REQUIRING A CONSOLIDATED BRIEF AND ARGUMENT..... | 9 |
| II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROVAL OF THE 'ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATORS' STATEMENTS WITHOUT BEING OTHERWISE CONNECTED TO THE CONSPIRACY IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND OTHER CIRCUITS..... | 12 |
| III. THE EVIDENCE FROM A FEDERAL WIRETAP BASED ON AN INVALID STATE WIRETAP WAS AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE..... | 14 |
| IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION UPHOLDING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS..... | 15 |
| V. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING..... | 16 |
| A. THE TRIAL JUDGE PRESIDING OVER A POST-TRIAL HEARING AT WHICH HE TESTIFIED DENIED PETITIONER AN IMPARTIAL DECISION ON THE JURY TAMPERING ISSUE..... | 16 |
| B. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO MAKE INQUIRY INTO THE EXTENT OF JURY CONTAMINATION BY HAVING ALL JURORS TESTIFY..... | 18 |
| VI. PETITIONER WAS DENIED TRIAL BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY..... | 20 |
| CONCLUSION..... | 23 |
| APPENDIX..... | 24 |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

| | <u>Pages</u> |
|---|--------------|
| <u>Farrow v. United States</u> , 580 F. 2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978)..... | 16 |
| <u>Glasser v. United States</u> , 315 U.S. 60 (1942)..... | 12, 14 |
| <u>Remmer v. United States</u> , 347 U.S. 227 (1954)..... | 20 |
| <u>Remmer v. United States</u> , 350 U.S. 377 (1956)..... | 21, 22 |
| <u>United States v. Baker</u> , 499 F. 2d 1845 (7th Cir. 1974).. | 16 |
| <u>United States v. Coward</u> , 630 F. 2d 229 (1982)..... | 13 |
| <u>United States v. Jones</u> , 542 F. 2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976).. | 12 |
| <u>United States v. Sarmiento-Perez</u> , 633 F. 2d 1902 (5th Cir. 1980)..... | 15 |
| <u>United States v. Solis</u> , 612 F. 2d 930 (5th Cir. 1980).. | 16 |
| <u>Wilson v. Florida</u> , 403 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1980)..... | 14 |
| <u>Wong Sun v. United States</u> , 371 U.S. 471 (1963)..... | 14 |

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| U.S. Const., Amd. 4..... | 2 |
| U.S. Const., Amd. 5..... | 2 |
| U.S. Const., Amd. 6..... | 3 |

STATUTES

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Title 21, U.S.C., §846..... | 3 |
|-----------------------------|---|

RULES

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Rule 30..... | 5 |
| Rule 43(a)..... | 5 |

Federal Rules of Evidence:

| | |
|--------------------------|-----------|
| Rule 104(a) and (b)..... | 3, 12 |
| Rule 605..... | 4, 16 |
| Rule 606(b)..... | 4, 19, 21 |

| | |
|--|------|
| Local Rule 19, Fourth Cir. Court of Appeals..... | 5, 9 |
|--|------|

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
TERESA ELEAZAR, Petitioner herein, prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered
on September 9, 1983.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
(App. infra, p. 1) is reported at 717 F. 2d 1481 (1983).
The decision of the District Court below (App. infra,
p. 28) was not reported.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on September 9, 1983. The petition for rehearing was denied November 14, 1983. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTORY AUTHORITY

1. The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

2. The Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution, which provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

3. The Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution, which provides:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

4. Title 21, United States Code, §846, which provides:

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

5. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) and (b), which provides:

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of

subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.

6. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 605, which provides:

Competency of Judge as Witness. The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.

7. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b) which provides:

Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

8. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30, which provides:

Instructions. At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to adverse parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.

9. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 43(a), which provides:

Presence of the Defendant. Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.

10. Local Rules, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Rule 19, which provides:

Consolidated Cases and Briefs. Related appeals or petitions for review will be consolidated in the Office of the Clerk, with notice to all parties, at the time a briefing schedule is established. One brief shall be permitted per side,

including parties permitted to intervene, in all cases consolidated by court order, unless leave to the contrary is granted upon good cause shown. In consolidated cases lead counsel shall be selected by the attorneys on each side and that person's identity made known in writing to the Clerk within seven (7) days of the date of the order of consolidation. In the absence of an agreement by counsel, the Clerk shall designate lead counsel. The individual so designated shall be responsible for the coordination, preparation and filing of the briefs and appendix.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The facts necessary to place in their setting the questions now raised are briefly as follows:

A. Procedural history.

Petitioner was tried on a superseding criminal Indictment in the Eastern District of North Carolina along with nine others. (App. infra, p. 34). She was charged with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of unlawful use of a communication facility (telephone) in furtherance of that conspiracy. The telephone conversation which was the basis of the substantive count was the same as the only overt act of the conspiracy count in which she was listed. Numerous pretrial motions were filed, including one to suppress the wiretap, which was denied. Requests for a preliminary determination that the government

could establish a conspiracy and each defendant's link to it by non-hearsay evidence was postponed until trial. The trial court never made such a determination as to petitioner. After a jury trial, petitioner was acquitted of the communication charge but was convicted on the conspiracy charge. Prior to sentencing, a hearing was held concerning the effect upon the jury of having been photographed by a person whose identity was not known to them, but who was identified at the hearing by the judge as having been an F.B.I. agent. The juror who had reported the incident to the trial judge was examined by the trial judge, who also testified to his handling of the incident, which had occurred without notification to any of the defendants. Petitioner received five years, to serve six months active, the remainder suspended, and she was placed on probation for five years. (App. infra, p. 33). She appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit consolidated the cases of all defendants for briefing and argument pursuant to their Local Rule 19. The Fourth Circuit upheld petitioner's conviction, (App., infra, p. 1), denied her motion for rehearing, and denied her motion for stay of the mandate. Petitioner continues free on bond during the pendency of her appeal by order of trial judge.

B. Evidence.

An investigation by Florida authorities prompted them to obtain a wiretap in another county, outside their

jurisdiction under Florida law. In the course of that wiretap they received information that James Jacques Provost was moving to Apex, North Carolina to conduct cocaine transactions. DEA agents used this information to obtain federal wiretap authorization. The interception of calls to and from Provost's house was the basis for the Indictment. By the time the Indictment was returned, Provost had died.

One of the named defendants, James "Bubba" Jackson, is the brother of petitioner Eleazar. During the period of the federal wiretap, he called her house several times. In general, his conversations were with her then boyfriend, co-defendant Jeffrey Craig Bumgardner. Petitioner Eleazar generally answered the telephone and discussed family matters, then gave the telephone to Bumgardner at her brother's request, and absented herself. In the one conversation in which the jury acquitted her of having a conversation to facilitate the conspiracy, she told her brother that another co-defendant "got all that stuff", the jury agreeing with Eleazar that this conversation had an innocent connotation. Bumgardner in another conversation told her brother that "Teresa picked it up and took it to Ronnie." There was also evidence that Eleazar had mailed her brother a money order in the name of James Jacques Provost, Raleigh, North Carolina, and the taped conversation showed she was unfamiliar with both the name and location. However, she was aware her brother had

jumped bond and, therefore, thought she understood the reason for putting a different name on the money order and being an anonymous sender.

REASONS TO GRANT THE WRIT

I. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL BY THE RULE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REQUIRING A CONSOLIDATED BRIEF AND ARGUMENT.

After the six defendants who were convicted filed their notices of appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered an order consolidating the cases for briefing and argument. Petitioner's attorney, who was appointed later by the Fourth Circuit, was notified of this by letter. (App., infra, p. 27). This consolidation was pursuant to the Local Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Rule 19. While in many cases, such consolidation may not be harmful, in the instant case it materially prejudiced petitioner's ability to present her case on appeal.

Petitioner was forced to rely upon the representation of co-defendants' counsel to present several issues on her behalf, both in the brief and at oral argument. She was not allowed to fully present issues solely as pertained to her

special situation. This deprived petitioner of the right to have her attorney present her case to the court.

Because of the time limits, the various issues were divided among counsel for the various defendants at a meeting shortly after petitioner's counsel became involved in the case. All material was sent to the lead counsel for assembling in a consolidated brief in time to have the Brief timely filed. Because of the limits on the length of the Brief, some issues were discarded. Petitioner would have, in an individual Brief, raised a severance issue based on the prejudice to her defense by the exclusion of the information that her brother was a bond jumper, which evidence provided innocent motive for some of her actions which the government argued showed her involvement in the conspiracy. That evidence was excluded upon her brother's motion as being prejudicial to him. The severance motion was made by petitioner at trial on the conflict of defenses ground as well as the presence of multiple conspiracies, most of which had no relation to her at all. The Brief was weighted for lead counsel's client, Petitioner's brother, in terms of amount of space spent on an argument pertaining solely to him.

Moreover, at oral argument the limitation of thirty minutes to a side resulted in petitioner's attorney not being able to argue. The only issues argued were the wiretap issue, the jury issue, and an Interstate Detainer Act issue which pertained solely to lead counsel's client.

Petitioner was prejudiced because she was in a special situation which none of the other defendants shared. She was the only defendant who testified in her own behalf at trial. She was the only defendant acquitted of any charge. The evidence against her was weak, and she was the least culpable, if at all. Some of the defendants had interests directly adverse to her, including her brother; for her to have to rely on their presentation of issues vitiated her right to independent counsel. She was denied due process by the curtailment of her opportunity to present her issues fully. Only this Court can rectify that denial.

Moreover, a check of the local rules of the other federal courts of appeals reveals that only the Fourth Circuit requires consolidation of briefs. While some of the other circuits provide for consolidation of oral argument, that appears to be on a case-by-case basis. Further, all the other courts except the District of Columbia circuit limit the attorneys who argue to so many per party, not per side. While there may be an interest in avoiding duplication, it does not overcome the petitioner's right to fully present her case to the court, structuring the issues in light of her own situation. Being denied both the right to present her case in written form as well as orally, meant that appellate review of petitioner's case was not meaningful, the court instead ruling on the totality of the case and lumping defendants together in categories.

Therefore, petitioner contends that this denial of her appellate rights merits review of her case by this Court, and a ruling made on the Fourth Circuit rule as applied in this case.

II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROVAL OF THE ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATORS' STATEMENTS WITHOUT BEING OTHERWISE CONNECTED TO THE CONSPIRACY IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND OTHER CIRCUITS.

Defendants had requested that the trial court make a determination that each defendant had been connected to the charged conspiracy by non-hearsay evidence before admitting co-conspirators' statements under Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) and (b). The Magistrate decided that such decision should be made at trial. The trial judge never made a decision as to petitioner, as required by Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942), and United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 207 (4th Cir., 1976). The trial court instead noted that petitioner still had to be connected to the conspiracy, at the time he held three of the defendants to have been so connected.

However, co-conspirator statements were allowed to be introduced which allegedly inculpated petitioner. The Fourth Circuit relied on such statements in stating the case against

her. 717 F.2d at 1490-91 (App., infra, p. 24). The only evidence against her which was not hearsay co-conspirator statements was her testimony that she mailed a money order to her brother which he apparently used or intended to use for drugs.

Moreover, petitioner contends that there was no proof she was a member of the charged conspiracy--the ring headed by Provost. Even assuming, arguendo, that she was conspiring with her brother and boyfriend, the government's evidence through its chief witness was that "(t)hey (Bubba's people) were not part of Mr. Provost's organization, per se." The evidence showed that the government's witnesses had engaged in endeavors of their own, without Provost's knowledge and indicated that Bubba was doing the same. Thus, a "wheel" conspiracy was shown. The Fourth Circuit erred in determining there was only one conspiracy, or at most "only two." 717 F.2d at 1489-90. (App., infra, pp. 21-22). The legal premise for that conclusion was also erroneous. The Court said that had other retailers been charged, then perhaps multiple conspiracies repugnant to U. S. v. Coward, 630 F.2d 229, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) would have been proven. 717 F.2d at 1489. (App., infra, p. 22). Clearly, all conspirators do not need to be charged for a conspiracy to exist. While the evidence tended to show Bubba was setting up his own organization, it did not show he contemplated it being part of Provost's. Provost was at that time out of cocaine and unable to distribute to anyone.

Therefore, by the Fourth Circuit ruling such hearsay statements to be admissible against petitioner, petitioner was denied due process and such decision is contrary to Glasser v. United States, supra, and the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated by this Court.

III. THE EVIDENCE FROM A FEDERAL WIRETAP BASED ON AN
INVALID STATE WIRETAP WAS AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE.

Wong Sun v. United States, 317 U.S. 471 (1963) held that the federal government could not use evidence which had a tainted source. Here the state officials provided a reverse "silver-platter", by giving information to the federal government which their courts had ruled illegal.

Wilson v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1980) held that it was illegal for police officers to conduct electronic monitors or surveillance outside their jurisdiction. Once outside their jurisdiction they no longer were law enforcement personnel under Florida statutes. In the instant case, the investigation was instigated by detectives of the Jacksonville Beach Police Department. The surveillance and interceptions which provided the basis for the federal wiretap was conducted in St. Johns and Duval Counties outside their jurisdiction.

After the majority of the interception was completed, the officers were deputized in the county. However, this was too late to remove the taint. Therefore, the evidence seized in the federal wiretap, based on illegally seized information, should have been suppressed.

IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION UPHOLDING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS.

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner. The only evidence against her was inadmissible hearsay evidence, plus a taped conversation and her own testimony that she had mailed some money to her brother. Most of the six taped conversations in which she was involved, reflected she answered the phone, inquired how her brother was, gave him messages ("Daddy needs to talk to you"). While the government contended this showed a criminal "pattern", Petitioner contends she was convicted for talking to her brother, and excessive guilt by association situation. Most of the circuits have found that such a situation is insufficient for a finding or participation in a conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982) (seeing defendant pick up the principal conspirators and being present when

they obtained the cocaine from defendant's car); United States v. Solis, 612 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1980) (Defendant was one of several brothers charged, defendant's phone was used during drug sale); United States v. Baker, 499 F.2d 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974). (Defendant present when his roommate and informant discussed drug sale and at sale).

This conflict in the circuits should be resolved by this Court.

V. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING.

A. THE TRIAL JUDGE PRESIDING OVER A POST-TRIAL HEARING
AT WHICH HE TESTIFIED DENIED PETITIONER AN IMPARTIAL
DECISION ON THE JURY TAMPERING ISSUE.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 605, a judge may not testify in the trial over which he presides. This has been construed to include post-trial hearings. See Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978), involving a sentencing judge testifying on the enhancement issue.

Here, a post-trial hearing was conducted by the trial judge into the effect that being photographed had upon the jury. The judge testified about his role and actions, which involved his conversations with a juror about the juror's complaint made during the trial, that he was being photographed, as were other members of the jury, by someone

unknown to them. These conversations occurred during the trial and without the knowledge of the defendants. Since the judge's actions were material in communicating with the juror, and in affecting the juror's stated apprehension, another judge should have heard the evidence and made the findings of fact on any prejudice resulting from the incident and the trial court's handling of it.

Of course, the trial judge could not be and was not cross-examined by defendant's attorney as to his actions. He made a statement for the record and then examined the juror. The Assistant United States Attorney asked one question. Then the judge made findings based on his own statement and his questions of the juror. Thus, he acted in several roles, that of witness, prosecutor and judge. His findings should, therefore, be subjected to closest scrutiny. The judge's discretion has been abused where he obviously has a preconceived idea before the hearing because of his involvement in the events which are the subject of the hearing.

The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial judge's findings of no unfair prejudice without considering the propriety or effect of the trial judge's involvement in the hearing. 717 F.2d at 1491. (App., infra, pp. 25-26). They required that there be a showing that the finding of no prejudice was "clearly erroneous," saying otherwise they could not reverse

the decision. Id. at 26. The "clearly erroneous" standard should not apply where the judge is so enmeshed in the dispute and takes such an active part in the hearing. His multi-role participation denied petitioner a fair and impartial hearing. Moreover, the judge's involvement gave him reason to find no error, in order to validate his own actions which perpetuated the prejudice to petitioner by having a jury which was concerned for their safety deliberate on her guilt or innocence. Such actions by the judge are grounds for reversal. By not even addressing this aspect of the hearing, the Fourth Circuit condoned it. This Court should reverse on this grounds alone, and not be bound by the trial court's findings in any manner.

B. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO MAKE INQUIRY
INTO THE EXTENT OF JURY CONTAMINATION BY HAVING
ALL JURORS TESTIFY.

When petitioner appeared for sentencing, her attorney was then informed that the trial judge was ready to hold the hearing about possible jury contamination, and that the juror with whom he had had contact, juror Denton, was present. The defendants requested that all jurors be subpoenaed to allow inquiry into the effect the photographing had upon each of them.

Juror Denton testified as to his own feelings, but added that other jurors had expressed concern over being photographed. Upon the judge's telling him the matter had been taken care of, he, following the judge's instructions, relayed this to the entire jury. Certainly there was no way to determine the effect this total incident had upon the jury panel.

The other aspect which should have also been investigated was whether juror Denton exposed jurors not previously aware of the incident, when he related the incident to them and told them he had consulted with the trial judge. Each juror was competent under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to testify as to any outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information brought to their attention. Denton, however, could only speculate as to the feelings of the others. Although he said there were no further discussions about the incident after he relayed the judge's instructions to them, this does not mean that all concern was allayed. At the hearing, knowing how many jurors had thought they were being photographed, their initial reaction, and their reactions to Denton's and the judge's actions was important in determining the impact of the incident upon the panel.

The trial judge, and the Fourth Circuit, while acknowledging that Denton stated several jurors had expressed to him similar concerns, based the finding of no possible

prejudice solely on Denton's statement that he had been reassured. The trial judge ruled that the other jurors were not involved in "the incident," (App., infra, p. 32). While they were not involved in direct communications with the trial judge, they reported they were concerned over being photographed, and any distinction between their involvement and Denton's is ridiculous. An examination of those jurors was equally as necessary as that of Denton.

Thus, although there was some evidence taken, there was not a hearing as contemplated by Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227 (1954). The petitioner was not allowed to examine every juror who felt, like Denton, that outside influence was being used against him.

Moreover, the trial judge required the defendants to show bias on part of the jury. (App., infra, p. 32). However, Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U. S. at 229, held that there was a presumption of prejudice which the government bore the burden of proving was, in fact, harmless. Thus, by using the wrong standard, the judge further erred, and petitioner was denied a fair hearing.

VI. PETITIONER WAS DENIED TRIAL BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY.

The petitioner was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury when a jury tainted by improper contact was allowed to

deliberate upon her case.

As stated in Argument V(b) above, any outside influence on the jury is presumed prejudicial. In the instant case, one juror on behalf of himself and other jurors related to the trial judge during the course of the trial that they were concerned for their safety because they thought they were being photographed upon exiting the courthouse.

The trial judge did not hold a hearing during the trial on the effect this incident had upon the jurors; indeed, he did not even notify the defendants until after the return of the verdict that he had been approached by a juror. Instead, he simply instructed the jury not to be concerned about it, without telling them what measures he had taken or who was behind the photographing. This Court in Remmer v. United States, 350 U. S. 377, 379 (1956), in holding that petitioners were entitled to a new trial, considered it important that the jury in that case did not know the outcome of the investigation. In the instant case, although juror Denton later testified he was not concerned after talking to the judge, he remained concerned enough to make inquiry of the judge immediately upon return of the verdict.

Had inquiry been made of the jury during trial, their true feelings and apprehensions could have been revealed without any infringement upon Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. If necessary, alternate jurors could have been used, or a mistrial declared at that point. At


that point, a hearing would have been meaningful. As stated in Remmer v. United States, 350 U. S. at 381, at a post-trial hearing, relying upon recollection, even the particular juror involved may not be able to determine how he was affected. By that time also, the judge and juror have an investment in the verdict and are reluctant to attack it.

Lastly, by the judge discussing this matter with juror Denton, petitioner was deprived of her right to be present at every stage of the trial as provided in Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since the judge was in effect giving the juror legal instructions, and, by asking juror Denton to tell the rest of the jury what he had said, gave instructions to the entire panel, the defendant should have been present. Under Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant could have objected, or requested further explanation of the situation to the jury.

As it was, by the trial judge keeping the entire matter secret, defendant was unknowingly tried by a jury panel which had improper outside influences brought to bear upon them. The government did not show the panel was not prejudiced to petitioner's detriment. This Court should reverse petitioner's conviction to allow her to be tried by an untainted and impartial jury.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner contends she was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury, that prejudicial error was committed violating her rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution, both on the trial and appellate levels, and that the Fourth Circuit decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and other circuits, and that a Writ for Certiorari should issue to review this case.


Christine Witcover Dean
Attorney for Petitioner
Suite 310, The Raleigh Building
Post Office Box 667
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Telephone: (919) 828-9800

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|
| FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINION..... | 1 |
| FOURTH CIRCUIT LETTER..... | 27 |
| ORDER..... | 28 |
| JUDGMENT..... | 33 |
| INDICTMENT..... | 34 |

PUBLISHED

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

No. 82-5274 (L)

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Ronald Doyle Hines,

Appellant.

No. 82-5275

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Gary J. Peed,

Appellant.

No. 82-5276

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Teresa Eleazar,

Appellant.

No. 82-5277

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

James Maurice Jackson,

Appellant.

No. 82-5278

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

James C. Coddington,

Appellant.

No. 82-5286

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Jeffrey Craig Bumgardner,

Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, United States District Judge.

Argued: July 14, 1983

Decided September 9, 1983

Before PHILLIPS, SPROUSE and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.

William J. Sheppard (Elizabeth L. White on brief) and Gary S. Lawrence (Steven D. Kupferberg; Hugh Clifton Talton, Jr.; Christine Witcover Dean; Edwin C. Walker on brief) for Appellants; William E. Martin, Assistant United States Attorney (Samuel T. Currin, United States Attorney, Wallace W. Dixon, Assistant United States Attorney, James G. Lindsay, U.S. Dept. of Justice on brief) for Appellee.

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

Ronald Doyle Hines, Gary J. Peed, Teresa Eleazar, James "Bubba" Jackson, James Coddington and Jeffrey Bumgardner appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina wherein they were tried for conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and of using a communication facility to facilitate the cocaine conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the prosecution's case at trial established the existence of a two-tier conspiracy. The first tier was headquartered in Apex, North Carolina, under the command of James "Jacques" Provost. Jacques had two investors or partners in the first tier, Gary Peed of Virginia and James Coddington of Orlando, Florida. The first tier had three employees who acted as drug couriers, Jacques's son Darryl Provost, Peter Stisser, and Bubba Jackson. Darryl and Peter turned government witnesses and provided the crucial trial testimony against their co-conspirators.

The second tier was the smaller and local operation in Jacksonville, Florida, including Ronald Hines, Jeffrey Bumgardner and Teresa Eleazar. Contacts between the two tiers were made by Bubba Jackson, Eleazar's brother.

The jury found appellants guilty of both counts, except that Eleazar was acquitted on the telephone facilitation count. Peed, Coddington, and Jackson were sentenced to four years imprisonment plus five years probation. Hines, Eleazar and Bumgardner received six months imprisonment with five years probation.

On appeal, the appellants claim nine reversible errors in their trial. Finding no merit to any of the challenges, we affirm.

I.

In September, 1980, a double murder occurred in Jacksonville Beach, Florida. In July, 1981, two Jacksonville Beach police investigators, Officers Dorn and Maxwell, learned that "Bones" Merrill might have acted as a lookout during the murders. Bones was questioned and agreed to act as an informant in the investigation of Jacques Provost, who was suspected of having ordered the murders to avenge a delinquent drug debt and is now deceased.

Beginning on July 27, 1981, Bones made seven or eight consensually recorded phone calls from pay telephones in Jacksonville Beach to Jacques's home in St. Johns County, Florida, which was outside Dorn's and Maxwell's bailiwick. Since most of the information obtained concerned Jacques's ongoing drug operations, on July 29, 1981, the information was

turned over to Agent Alford of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, an agency with statewide jurisdiction.

On August 29, Alford obtained an electronic surveillance warrant for Jacques's St. Johns County home. Alford eventually learned that Jacques had moved the center of his drug operations to a house in Apex, North Carolina.

Alford passed the information on to Agent Johannesen of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") in Raleigh, North Carolina. Johannesen used the information to obtain a wiretap on Jacques's telephone in Apex from September 29, 1981 to October 14, 1981. Information developed from the wiretap led to the indictments of the appellants.

Appellants complain that the Apex wiretap evidence should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of the Florida consensual monitoring and electronic surveillance, which appellants contend were illegal. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The consensual monitoring allegedly was illegal because officers Maxwell and Dorn were operating outside their jurisdiction. Appellants challenge the electronic surveillance on the grounds that it was issued based on an affidavit that contained intentional, reckless, and material misrepresentations.

Appellants contend that Maxwell and Dorn, Jacksonville Beach police officers, acted outside their jurisdiction by consensually monitoring Bones's nine pre-August

6, 1981 calls to Jacques's St. Johns County home. Maxwell and Dorn were not deputized in St. Johns County until August 6, 1981. Appellants rely on Wilson v. Florida, 403 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1980), in which Lake City, Florida, police officers conducted an investigation into Wilson's possession of drugs outside the municipal limits of Lake City. In conducting the investigation, the officers employed an electronic listening device that was hidden on an informant who purchased drugs from Wilson outside Lake City. The court held that fruits of the electronic surveillance could not form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant because the officers were without authority to conduct the investigation.

Wilson, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Wilson, the investigation was into the possession of contraband outside Lake City. The Wilson court indicated, 403 So.2d at 984, that it would have reached a different result had the investigation been into Wilson's illegal acts within Lake City: "a municipal police officer . . . may conduct investigations outside the city limits . . . where the subject matter of the investigation originated inside the city limits, State v. Chapman, 376 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Parker v. State, 362 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)." Here, the subject matter of the investigations, the 1980 double murder in Jacksonville Beach, did originate within the city limits.

Of the nine pre-August 6 telephone calls, the first seven or eight were made from Jacksonville Beach, so Maxwell and Dorn were within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, since Dorn and Maxwell brought agent Alford, who had statewide jurisdiction, into the investigation on July 29, the monitoring of Bones's calls from Jacksonville were under the direction of Alford; i.e the officers acted "under color of law," 28 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(C), or "under the direction of a law enforcement officer," Fla. Stat. 934.03(2)(c).¹ Thus, the pre-August 6 calls comply with both the federal and state consensual monitoring statutes.²

¹ 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(C) provides:

It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.

Fla. Stat. 934.03(2)(c) provides:

It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.

² It is unnecessary to decide the government's claim that

Appellants contend that the application of agent Alford for the Florida wiretap contained material misrepresentations which were intentionally and recklessly made and which were necessary to the finding of probable cause and, thus, that the Florida wiretap evidence was illegally seized under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The alleged misrepresentations are that (1) Bones was a collector of drug debts for Jacques, (2) Bones revealed that Jacques imported drugs and was putting together an airplane scheme involving 15 kilograms of cocaine, (3) Jacques told Bones that he had some "heavy business", wanted Bones to work for him, and was meeting with some business associates to plan a large transaction, (4) Bones and Jacques discussed the details of a trip down south, (5) Jacques told Bones that he was waiting for a phone call and

the Jacksonville monitoring was valid because Dorn and Maxwell were "special deputies" in Jacksonville. Fla. Stat. § 30.08(4)(B) permits special deputies to conduct investigative work. The district court did not decide the question, but simply stated that "the officers may have had special deputy status [within Jacksonville] and, if so, the Jacksonville calls would have been within their jurisdiction."

We also do not reach the government's argument that the appellants have no standing since none of them had possession or privacy interests in the consensually monitored telephone calls and none of the conversations involved any of the appellants; i.e., they were neither victims nor targets of the consensually monitored calls. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The district court did not address the argument and it is not clear whether it was raised below.

would know more after he received it, and (6) Darryl Provost told Bones that there was a change of plans and Bubba Jackson was going up north to collect some money.

Our review of the record, however, indicates that the alleged misrepresentations either did not occur or were immaterial: (1) during an August 3, 1981 interview of Bones by Maxwell and Dorn, Bones indicated that he collected drug debts in New York and Atlanta for Jacques; (2) during the August 3 interview, Bones and the officers discussed the plane deal; (3) while Jacques did not say he had some "heavy" business, he did say "I got two business people with me" who are "real business" people and "ah man, if you could see all the [stuff] that Mike and Bang put me in its unbelievable," and arranged for Bones to come to Jacques's home to discuss work; (4) Jacques told Bones on July 30, 1981 that "I was thinking of sending you with [Darryl] down south" and "I don't know what time you guys be leaving, but I would around twelve"; (5) although Jacques did not say he was waiting on a phone call, he did tell Bones that for the moment he had nothing for Bones to do, but that he was "waiting for somebody to be here" so Bones should call back "around supper,"; and (6) Bones's telephone call of August 1 and August 5 interview, when read together, indicate that Jackson had traveled north and Jacques was waiting for him to bring back some money. Not only are there no material misrepresentations, but there is no indication that the minor

inaccuracies were intentional or reckless. Thus, the Florida wiretap evidence was not illegally seized under Franks.

II.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IAD") provides that if trial is not held within 120 days of the date a prisoner arrives in a receiving state, the charges are to be dismissed with prejudice. 18 U.S.C. Appx. Art. IV(C), V(C). The running of the 120-day limitation, however, may be tolled by the district court "for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present." Id.

The government brought Bubba Jackson to North Carolina for trial from Florida, where he was in custody, by detainer. The 120-day limitation began running on April 13, 1982, the date Jackson arrived in North Carolina. See United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806, 810-11 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980). The trial commenced on August 24, 1982, 133 days later. The parties dispute whether the running of the 120-day limitation period was tolled for at least 13 days.

In United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2946 (1983), this court held that a defendant waives the 120-day limitation by requesting to be treated in a manner inconsistent therewith. The Odom court also held that the periods excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (e.g., period from filing to

disposition of pretrial motion) likewise should be excluded under the IAD. Thus, the government seeks to exclude all days from the filing of pretrial motions to the prompt disposition of those motions, since on April 26 Jackson moved the court to allow him to adopt the motions of his co-defendants. Hearings alone on these pretrial motions took 16 days (May 20-31, June 11-12, June 21-22). Indeed, in rejecting Jackson's motion for dismissal under the IAD, the district court found that Jackson's joining in the motion to suppress the wiretap evidence, without more, amounted to a waiver of the 120-day limitation.

Of critical importance in the instant situation are defendant Jackson's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of various electronic surveillances. Had the motion to suppress been allowed, it is doubtful that the government could have proceeded to trial since its case was based almost entirely upon this evidence. At least forty-seven days were required by the Magistrate to consider fully and make a recommendation concerning these motions to suppress. Since the trial commenced thirteen days after the running of the 120-day limitation, the 47-day delay caused by defendant Jackson's motions to suppress provides sufficient justification for the denial of defendant Jackson's motion to dismiss based upon the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

The government also lists several continuances (i.e. requests to be treated inconsistently with the IAD) granted at Jackson's request: (1) at the request of Jackson's attorney, pretrial hearing was delayed three days from June 7 to June 10

(2) the June 10-12 hearings were continued nine days until June 21 at the request of all attorneys, including Jackson's; (3) at Jackson's attorney's request, defense counsel were given ten days, from June 22 until July 2 to file additional memoranda; and (4) Jackson's attorney, as well as other defense counsel, indicated that the clerk's suggested trial date of July 19 was not satisfactory, and the trial eventually was set for August 16.

Jackson attacks the government's assertion that he sought continuances. He cannot, however, rebut the government's claim that he sought an additional ten days to file memoranda or that he indicated that a July 19 trial date was unsatisfactory. Furthermore, even without considering the continuances, Jackson must be deemed to have waived the 120-day limitation by joining in the co-defendants' motions, especially the motion to suppress the wiretap evidence.

It is not surprising that Jackson was held beyond 120 days given defense counsel's extensive pretrial motions. Jackson joined in those motions, which took a substantial amount of time to resolve, and then surprised the district court by moving for a dismissal under the IAD on the first day of trial. Jackson sought to benefit from the pretrial motions which necessarily resulted in delays, and cannot now claim that he is aggrieved under the IAD by those delays.

III.

Appellants argue that the indictment did not charge possession of a controlled substance listed under 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II, and that the government failed to prove possession of a § 812 Sched. II controlled substance. The arguments are meritless.

The indictments charge a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute "a schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, in violation of the provisions of 21 United States Code, § 841(a)(1)." Appellants note that possession of some cocaine isomers is legal and conclude that the use of the single word "cocaine" makes the indictment insufficient. The argument ignores the placing of "cocaine" in apposition to the phrase "a schedule II controlled substance." The indictment thus clearly contains a sufficient description of the "controlled substance" element of the offense.

Appellants claim that the government failed to prove that the cocaine here was the illegal kind of cocaine that is a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II. Appellants point out that the government's expert testified that the seized substance was "cocaine" but that it was not a "narcotic." Since the statutory definitions of the narcotic cocaine and controlled substance cocaine are similar, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(16), 812 Sched. II.(a)(4), appellants conclude

that the evidence was consistent with a conspiracy to distribute the legal kind of cocaine.

The government's expert, however, was unequivocal that the seized cocaine was a controlled substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II. Her statement that in chemical terms cocaine is "a stimulant or basic euphoriant," but not a "narcotic" did not affect her conclusion that the seized cocaine was a controlled substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 812 Sched. II. Furthermore, she stated only that cocaine chemically is not a narcotic, not that cocaine is not a narcotic as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(16). Moreover, the offense charged, violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), requires proof of "possess[ion] with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a [§ 812 Sched. II] controlled substance." Whether cocaine is a narcotic within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) was irrelevant to the determination of guilt or innocence.³

³ Thus, the trial court instructed the jury that whether cocaine is a narcotic is

not material to the guilt or innocence of any of the defendants in the charges as contained in the Bill of Indictment. Therefore, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the substance referred to in the indictment was a narcotic.

I instruct you that cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance. It is a

IV.

Out-of-court statements by co-conspirators made "during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy" are not hearsay and are admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Their admissibility turns on "the existence of substantial evidence of the conspiracy other than the statement itself." United States v. Dockins, 659 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir. 1981). Whether such evidence exists is a question for the trial judge. Fed. R. Evid. 104; United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 n.33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).

Appellants, relying on the Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979), argue that it was error for the trial court here not to hold a hearing to determine the existence of the conspiracy before any of the co-conspirator statements were admitted in the case-in-chief. This court, however, does not require the James hearing. Instead, a trial judge retains the option to admit conditionally the declarations of co-conspirators before the conspiracy has been independently

violation of the laws of the United States for two or more persons to conspire or join together in an agreement to commit an offense in violation of the laws of the United States relating to cocaine.

established, subject to the subsequent fulfillment of that factual predicate. United States v. McCormick, 565 F.2d 286, 289 n.5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978). The district court safeguards the defendant's rights by being prepared either to declare a mistrial or to dismiss the case if the government fails to prove aliunde that a conspiracy existed. Here, that declaration was unwarranted since the existence of a conspiracy was proved by a preponderance of the independent evidence. Indeed, appellants do not challenge the district court's finding that there was sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy among Coddington, Jackson, and Peed. Rather, they claim a lack of independent evidence that Eleazar, Bumgardner, and Hines were part of that conspiracy. Our review of the evidence, however, indicates otherwise. The recorded conversations of Bumgardner, Hines and Eleazar with Jackson, the go-between of this two-tiered conspiracy, are replete with references by them to their cocaine dealings. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(4). Although Eleazar made only two comments during those calls, one comment -- "Ronnie got all that stuff" -- apparently informed Jackson that a cocaine delivery had been accomplished and she admitted sending money, which other evidence indicated was in payment for drugs, under a false name to Jackson. This independent evidence was sufficient to establish their participation in the two-tier conspiracy.

V.

During the course of the trial, evidence of appellants' bad acts other than the cocaine conspiracy was introduced: (1) Stisser testified that he delivered cocaine to Coddington on a date subsequent to the period of the conspiracy charged; (2) references were made to marijuana dealings before the inception of the cocaine conspiracy; (3) Darryl Provost and Stisser testified that they dealt in quaaludes with Jacques Provost; and (4) Eleazar testified that Jackson was a bone jumper. Appellants argue that they were unfairly prejudiced by the other acts evidence because (1) the consideration of such evidence was not limited to the defendants involved in the acts, thus allowing the government to prove guilt by association, and (2) the evidence was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404 as allowing the government to prove guilt by bad character.

While other bad acts evidence is not admissible to show the character of the accused, it is admissible to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, and the like. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Thus, the district court here instructed the jury:

[I]f you, the jury, should find beyond a reasonable doubt, from other evidence in the case, that the accused did the acts charged in this indictment, then the jury may consider evidence as to some other act of a similar or like nature, on the part of the accused, in determining the state

of mind or intent, with which the accused did the act which is charged in the indictment. And where proof of an alleged similar act, done at some other time or place, is clear and conclusive, the jury may, but is not obligated to, draw the inference and find that in doing the act charged in this indictment, the accused acted wilfully and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. (emphasis added).

Not only did that instruction limit the jury's consideration of the other acts evidence to proof of wilfullness or absence of mistake, but it also limited consideration to the particular accused who performed the other act.

Furthermore, the specific other acts evidence admitted satisfied Rule 404(b) and the probativeness-prejudice balancing requirement of Rule 403. Stisser testified that he delivered cocaine to Coddington in late October, several weeks after the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Nevertheless, this court has held that "subsequent conduct may be highly probative of prior intent." United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1982). The probativeness is especially great here given the closeness in time -- several weeks -- of the similar acts.

Although the marijuana conspiracy counts were severed before trial on the grounds that "evidence concerning the marijuana conspiracy may very well be prejudicial to the defendants not charged in those counts," that does not automatically require a finding of unfair prejudice because of

the limited references to marijuana dealings in the cocaine trial. Presumably, if the counts had not been severed, a significantly higher quantity of evidence concerning the marijuana conspiracy would have been introduced, thereby increasing the possibility of prejudice. Here, the limited references to marijuana dealings in order to show intent concerning the cocaine dealings were proper under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 543-45 (4th Cir. 1981) (evidence concerning marijuana and hashish dealings admissible under Rule 404(b) on charge of cocaine conspiracy). The same reasoning applies to the references to quaalude dealings.

While Eleazar's testimony about Jackson being a bond jumper was not admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence was elicited by Eleazar's defense counsel, not the government, and immediately struck by the district court as inadmissible hearsay with the instruction to the jury to disregard it. We discern no reversible error in the district court's handling of the inadmissible testimony. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911 (1980), ("[a]bsent . . . misconduct on the part of the government counsel, the courts generally have discerned no reversible error where the trial court has acted promptly in sustaining an objection and advising the jury to disregard the testimony).

VI.

The government bears the burden of proving the single conspiracy it charged in the indictment. On appeal, this court must determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), supports the jury's finding of a single conspiracy. If not, reversal is required only where proof of the multiple conspiracies prejudiced the defendants' substantial rights. United States v. Coward, 630 F.2d 229, 231 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982).

Appellants argue that their convictions were flawed because the government proved ten conspiracies instead of the single conspiracy charged. Appellants view the evidence as showing a wheel conspiracy with Peed, Coddington, and Jackson at the center and Hines, Eleazar, and Bumgardner as one of the spokes. Since the government did not show that Hines, Bumgardner, and Eleazar knew of the other spokes in the conspiracy, the three could not be considered members of the overall wheel conspiracy. Absent proof of such knowledge, the evidence shows numerous separate conspiracies (i.e., unrelated spokes). We cannot agree.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a two-tiered conspiracy was shown. The first level included Peed, Coddington, and Jackson and the second included Bumgardner, Hines, and Eleazar. Jackson was the link between the two tiers. The first tier was the wholesaler and

the second the retailer. This chain conspiracy is not unlike other multi-level schemes that have been found to constitute a single conspiracy. See United States v. Aqueci, 310 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 272 U.S. 959 (1963) (chain narcotics distribution conspiracy extends several levels from importation through selling of drugs to user). This would be a different case if the government attempted to charge retailers, i.e., other spokes, other than Bumgardner, Hines, and Eleazar. Here, however, the evidence clearly shows that those three were part of a single retail operation.

The government proved at most two conspiracies, separate wholesale and retail conspiracies.⁴ Nevertheless, proof of those two separate conspiracies would not have prejudiced appellants under Coward since the jury would not have been confused into imputing guilt to members of one conspiracy because of the illegal activities of the other conspiracy. With only two conspiracies, each at a distinct level, and simple in operation, the jury was not likely to confuse evidence concerning one level as being relevant concerning the other. Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (proof of separate conspiracies with numerous defendants where conspiracies complex amounts to prejudice).

⁴ That view of the evidence requires disregarding the substantial evidence that Jackson linked the two levels.

VII.

Agent Johannesen testified at trial against Jackson. His trial testimony accurately reflected the dollar amount and quantity of a certain transaction involving Jackson. Before the grand jury, Johannesen had overstated the dollar amounts and quantity. In order to impeach Johannesen's testimony, Jackson's attorney sought to introduce the entire written grand jury testimony of Johannesen. When Coddington's counsel objected to the introduction of the entire written testimony on the grounds of irrelevancy, the district court limited Jackson's attorney to introducing the inconsistent statements by having Johannesen read to the jury his prior inconsistent statements. Jackson now argues that the limitation was error and the written transcript should have been submitted to the jury. The argument is frivolous. The district court did not abuse its discretion. The jury was made aware of the prior inconsistent testimony and protected from other irrelevant (and perhaps prejudicial) evidence in Johannesen's grand jury testimony.

VIII.

Eleazar and Hines argue that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, however, the evidence is sufficient to support both convictions.

Most of Jackson's calls were made to Eleazar's telephone in Florida. During one call, Eleazar indicated that a cocaine delivery involving Hines had been accomplished. Later during that conversation, Bumgardner informed Jackson that Eleazar "went by and picked it up," the "it" meaning cocaine." In another conversation, Eleazar told Jackson, "Bumgardner needs to talk to you," whereupon Jackson and Bumgardner proceeded to discuss a cocaine deal. Eleazar also sent money to Jackson, under instructions to use a false name, and evidence indicated that the money was in payment for drugs. Although Eleazar offered her own version of events, the jury apparently did not accept her story, and viewing the evidence favorably toward the government, her conviction must stand.⁵

Ronald Hines claims a lack of proof as to his identity as a participant in the conspiracy because he was not identified pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(6). That rule allows "[b]y way of illustration only" identification of a telephone caller by evidence that the call was made to a number assigned to him. Hines claims that the proof of his identity was inadequate because "the called party only identified

⁵ The verdict of not guilty on the use of the telephone count is not inconsistent because the jury could have convicted her on the conspiracy count for picking up the drugs, and sending the money, which did not involve her use of the telephones.

himself as 'Ronnie'. The number . . . is not subscribed to by a Ronnie." Hines also points out that there is no proof that he was at the residence at the time of the call. Nor was the recorded voice identified as his. His argument is completely without merit.

Not only did the conversant identify himself as "Ronnie," but the phone was registered in the name of his parents and Hines was at the house when a DEA investigator visited the house. That evidence is sufficient to establish Hines's identity as the conversant.

IX.

One day during the trial, an FBI agent photographed persons leaving the courthouse and was noticed by juror Denton. Juror Denton advised the court and was informed that the photographs were not being made of jurors, that there was no cause for concern, and that the matter should be disregarded. At a post-trial hearing on the possible prejudicial influence of the picture-taking episode, juror Denton indicated that after receiving the court's assurances, he was not concerned about the photographing and the incident did not affect his deliberations. Nor was the incident further discussed by him or the other jurors after he conveyed the court's assurances to the other jurors. The district court considered Denton's testimony credible and found that the episode had no prejudicial influence on the jury. That finding is not clearly

erroneous. Under Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956), appellants were entitled to a hearing, which they received, on the possible prejudicial impact of the episode. Absent a showing that the district court's finding of no unfair prejudice was clearly erroneous, we cannot reverse.

X.

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions are

AFFIRMED.

CLERK'S OFFICE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
TENTH & MAIN STREETS
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219-3599

WILLIAM K. SLATE, II
CLERK

TELEPHONE
1804: 771-2313
FIS 925-2313

November 16, 1982

Ms. Christine W. Dean
P. O. Box 667
Raleigh, NC 27602

Re: 82-5276, USA v. Teresa Eleazer (CR 82-8-04-CR-5)

Dear Ms. Dean:

Per our telephone conversation of November 15, 1982, enclosed please find an order whereby you have been appointed to represent the appellant shown above in lieu of Mr. Allen Tew who has been relieved.

Enclosed are the following:

- (1) Counsel of Record form
- (2) Check List (to appellant's counsel only)
- (3) Policy Memoranda
- (4) Local Rules of this Court
- (5) Appointment and Voucher for Counseling Services (CJA Form 20) along with information regarding appointments under the Criminal Justice Act

As I advised you by telephone, this case has been consolidated with five others. By copy of this letter, I am advising Mr. Tew of your appointment as well as the other attorneys in these appeals. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM K. SLATE, II

By 

Deborah A. Davenport
Deputy Clerk

/dd

cc: Allen Roger Tew, Esq.
Hugh Clifton Talton, Jr., Esq. (Case No. 82-5274(L))
Gary S. Lawrence, Esq. (Case No. 82-5275)
William J. Sheppard, Esq. (Case No. 82-5277)
Steven D. Kupferberg, Esq. (Case No. 82-5278)
Edwin C. Walker, Esq. (Case No. 82-5286)
Sidney M. Glazer, Esq. (Counsel for Appellee)
J. Douglas McCullough, Esq. (Counsel for Appellee) 27

FILE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION

NOV - 8 1982

J. RICH LEONARD, CLERK
U. S. DISTRICT COURT
E. DIST. NO. CAR.

No. 82-8-CR-5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEFFREY CRAIG BUMGARDNER,
et al.

ORDER

Ch. 22 #30, p. 153

This matter is before the Court on motion of defendants for a new trial based on an incident occurring during the trial involving the jury.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The trial was begun at 10:00 a.m. on 24 August 1982 with the selection of a jury consisting of twelve regular and two alternate members. On 25 August 1982, the jury was impaneled and the trial begun. During the course of the trial, the names of Costello Ramey and Doug Ross were mentioned as suppliers of drugs to the organization in which the defendants were involved. On 1 September 1982, Costello Ramey and Doug Ross were called as witnesses by one of the defendants and each took the fifth amendment. Court adjourned at 4:30 p.m. on that date, and shortly thereafter juror, Bryant Deaton, reported to Susan Umstead, law clerk for the presiding judge, that someone was taking pictures of jurors as they left the courthouse. Mr. Deaton was brought into the Judge's Chambers and, at that time, advised the Court that as he and some of the other jurors were leaving the main entrance of the courthouse an unidentified

28

295

individual sitting in a car parked at the curb in front of the courthouse appeared to be taking pictures of the jurors. Mr. Deaton further informed the Court that he had taken down the license number of the automobile. The Court, thereupon, took the slip of paper on which the license number was written down by the juror, advised the juror that he would look into the matter and excused him. Immediately thereafter, the Court requested an FBI agent to come to chambers. Agent Albert P. Koehler responded, and he was advised of the incident and requested by the Court to immediately investigate the matter and report back to the Court as promptly as possible.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on 2 September 1982, Agent Koehler came to chambers and reported to the Court that the photographs were being taken by another FBI agent, James J. Roche, Jr., of the two suspected drug dealers, Ramey and Ross. When juror Deaton arrived at court, he was brought to chambers by Susan Umstead, law clerk for the presiding judge, at which time he was advised that the Court had ascertained the identity of the photographer. The Court further assured the juror that photographs were not being made of jurors, that there was no cause for concern by him or any other juror, and that he should disregard the incident entirely. The Court further advised juror Deaton that the Court was not at liberty to discuss the matter further at that time but could possibly do so at some later date.

On 3 September 1982 at 10:00 a.m., the jury retired to begin its deliberations. At 7:23 p.m. the jury returned

its verdict. Before leaving the courtroom, juror Deaton inquired of the Court further concerning the picture-taking incident. The Court again advised juror Deaton that it was not at liberty to discuss the matter further at that time but would, at a later date should he make further inquiry. The jury was then discharged and the Court advised the parties of the incident and what had transpired thereafter.

Motions for a new trial based on alleged prejudice resulting from the picture-taking incident have been filed by all defendants. On 30 September 1982, a hearing was conducted at which time Agents Koehler, Roche and Susan Rowley, who was in the automobile with Agent Roche at the time of the incident, and juror Deaton testified. All were examined initially by the Court and all defense counsel were given an opportunity to question the witnesses.

CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS

The defendants contend first, that the Court erred in not bringing the matter to their attention at the time it occurred and conducting a hearing involving one or more of the jurors and secondly, that the cause of the defendants was prejudiced by the incident. Defendants principally rely on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) and Smith v. Phillips, ___ U.S. ___, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

DECISION

The presence of cameras of all varieties in and about the courthouse is an everyday occurrence. In the Eastern District of North Carolina, the taking of photographs in the courtroom,

court offices, or in corridors immediately adjacent thereto is prohibited by local rule. Local Rule 8.00, E.D.N.C. The courtroom in the Raleigh Courthouse is located on the seventh floor of the Federal Building. Although the local rule prohibits the taking of photographs on the seventh floor, it is not unusual for photographers to be stationed in the lobby where the elevators empty and out in front of the courthouse. Thus, the taking of photographs of participants in a court proceeding if not an everyday occurrence is, at least, not an unusual occurrence.

Remmer involved a situation where a remark had been made to a juror during trial that the juror could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to the defendant. Smith involved a situation where a juror had made application for employment in the prosecuting attorney's office while serving as a juror in the case. Other cases brought to the attention of the Court or disclosed by its own research involve contact with or by a juror. None have been found in which it has been contended that the jury was prejudiced because of an event not directly involving a member of the jury panel.

The Court's concern at the time of the incident was first, to determine who the photographer was and second, to alleviate any fears on the part of the juror that there was any threat to his safety or well-being. Both of these objectives were accomplished with a minimum of effort and without disruption of the trial. When questioned, juror Deaton testified that he had no apprehension or concern for his safety. He further testified that the incident did not in any way affect his delibe-

rations or decision as a juror and that he felt that it did not in any way affect the decision of the other jurors. He specifically testified that after the Court assured him there was nothing to be concerned about that the matter was not mentioned by him or any of the jurors again.


The burden is on defendants to show bias on the part of the jury. Smith v. Phillips, supra. This they have failed to do.

Defendants contend that the Court should have required all of the jurors to be brought in as witnesses and subjected to examination by the Court and cross-examination by the attorneys. The Court disagrees, finding that the testimony of the juror Deaton is highly credible and believable, that the incident was not mentioned again during the course of the trial or jury deliberations. That being true, it is inconceivable to the Court that any of the other jurors, not directly involved in the incident, could have been prejudiced or influenced in any way.

The motions for new trial are denied.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

This 8 November 1982.


W. EARL BRITT
United States District Judge

DEFENDANT

TERESA FLEAZER

DOCKET NO. 82-8-04-CR-5
RALEIGH DIVISION

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMUNITY ORDER

In the presence of the attorney for the government
the defendant appeared in person on this date

MONTH DAY YEAR
September 30 1982

COUNSEL

☐ WITHOUT COUNSEL However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant desired to have counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel.

☒ WITH COUNSEL Allen L. Jew - Court-appointed

PLEA

☐ GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea, ☐ NOLO CONTENDERE, ☒ NOT GUILTY by the jury in Count 5

FINDING & JUDGMENT

There being ~~pleading~~ verdict of ☐ NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged from the offense of using communication facility in conspiracy.
☒ GUILTY by the jury in Count 1, on 9/3/82

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C., Secs. 841(a)(1) & 846, as charged in Count 1, as contained in the Superseding Indictment.

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that: The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of

COUNT 1 - Five (5) years - and pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Sec. 3651 the defendant be confined in a jail-type or treatment institution for a period of six (6) months, the execution of the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment is hereby suspended and the defendant placed on probation for a period of five (5) years, to commence upon the defendant's release from confinement, under the general conditions as recorded in the Clerk's Office.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

1. Defendant is to comply with all local, state and federal laws.
2. Defendant is to comply with the rules and regulations of the Probation Office.
3. Defendant is to abstain from the use of controlled substances and submit to a search by the Probation officer or any other lawful officer without the necessity of a warrant and to the administration of any generally accepted test to determine the use of controlled substance including but not limited to urinalysis.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general conditions of probation set out on the reverse side of this judgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, and at any time during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by law, may issue a warrant and revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.

COMMITMENT RECOMMENDATION

The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General. Defendant is allowed to go under existing bond and to report at her own expense to the designated facility upon notification from the U.S. Marshal.

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

THUMB BY
☒ U.S. District Judge

W. EARL BRITT

Date September 30, 1982

☒ U.S. Magistrate

Sp. dist.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION

No. 92-8-01-CR-5
No. 92-8-02-CR-5
No. 92-8-03-CR-5
No. 92-8-04-CR-5
No. 92-8-05-CR-5
No. 92-8-06-CR-5
No. 92-8-07-CR-5
No. 92-8-08-CR-5
No. 92-8-09-CR-5
No. 92-8-10-CR-5

JUN 15 1992
J. MICHAEL LEONARD, CLERK
U. S. DISTRICT COURT
E. DIST. NO. C.V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

vs.)

INDICTMENT
(Superseding)

JEFFREY CRAIG BUNGARDNER)
GARY J. FEED,)
a/k/a "George")
RONALD DOYLE HINES)
TERESA ELEAZER)
DARREY. STEPHEN PROVOST)
JAMES MAURICE JACKSON,)
a/k/a "Bubba")
JAMES C. CODDINGTON)
PETER DAVID STISSER)
DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST)
TIMA PITTS PROVOST)

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1)
& § 846

That beginning on or about the 28th day of September, 1981, and continuing thereafter until on or about the 14th day of October, 1981, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, JEFFREY CRAIG BUNGARDNER, GARY J. FEED, a/k/a "George," RONALD DOYLE HINES, TERESA ELEAZER, DARREY. STEPHEN PROVOST, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," JAMES C. CODDINGTON, and PETER DAVID STISSER, hereafter named as defendants, did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other and with James Jacques Provost, now deceased, and with diverse other persons whose names are to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

The object of the conspiracy was:

That the defendants and others would knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

OVERT ACTS

1. From on or about September 28, 1981, until October 14, 1981,

34

James Jacques Provost, DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST, and PETER DAVID STISSER occupied a house located at Rural Road #1141, Route #2, Apex, North Carolina.

2. From on or about September 28, 1981, until on or about October 14, 1981, DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST and TINA PITTS PROVOST either jointly or separately occupied a house located at 204 Trails End, Raleigh, North Carolina.

3. From on or about September 28, 1981, until on or about October 14, 1981, telephone #919-362-0216 was subscribed to in the name of DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST. That telephone was installed in the residence at Rural Road #1141, Route #2, Apex, North Carolina.

4. During the period of time pertinent herein, James Jacques Provost had agreed to pay PETER DAVID STISSER two hundred dollars (\$200.00) per week plus a special rate during times of travel on assignment away from the aforementioned Apex, North Carolina, residence.

5. On or about the 2nd day of October, 1981, James Jacques Provost and GARY J. FEED, a/k/a "George," discussed the movement of a substance described as 82-88 percent pure from Apex, North Carolina, to Oakton, Virginia.

6. On or about October 2, 1981, DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST left Apex, North Carolina, for the Oakton, Virginia, area to deliver about seven (7) ounces of cocaine plus cutting agents to GARY J. FEED, a/k/a "George."

7. On or about October 2, 1981, at about 11:30 p.m., DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST was stopped by Virginia State Police near Fairfax, Virginia, at which time the approximately seven (7) ounces of cocaine plus cutting agents were seized.

8. On or about the 4th day of October, 1981, DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST talked about DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST getting caught with a pound.

9. On or about October 4, 1981, DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST telephoned PETER DAVID STISSER. STISSER told him "George" should be taking care of things up there, just sit there, and we're behind you brother.

10. On or about October 4, 1981, JAMES C. CODDINGTON called James Jacques Provost and they talked about "Bubba" traveling to Florida. CODDINGTON asked if Provost wanted 3 to 5 C.O.D.

11. On or about October 5, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," called telephone #904-354-5409 and asked for Ronnie. Ronnie told JACKSON "it was 1/2 gram short." JACKSON asked Ronnie if he had the 50; Ronnie replied, 30 of it. Telephone #904-354-5409 is subscribed to by H. C. Minas.

12. On or about the 8th day of October, 1981, JAMES C. CODDINGTON telephoned and talked to PETER DAVID STISSER. He told STISSER that the Florida delivery was 3 1/2 short. STISSER said his scales were possibly wrong.

13. On or about October 8, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," called his sister, TERESA ELEAZER, and she told JACKSON that "Ronnie got all that stuff." TERESA ELEAZER then put JEFFREY CRAIG BUNGARDNER on the phone and JACKSON asked BUNGARDNER "how much was in there." BUNGARDNER responded, "all of it 'cept for a half" and "Teresa picked it up and took it back to Ronnie."

14. On or about the 12th day of October, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," told PETER DAVID STISSER that James Jacques Provost wanted everything out of the house and hidden in the bushes behind the house.

Said acts, and other overt acts both known and not known to the Grand Jury, being committed in the furtherance of said conspiracy to violate the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.

COUNT TWO

21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1)
& § 846

That beginning on or about late August, 1981, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, and continuing thereafter until on or about the 14th day of October, 1981, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," PETER DAVID STISSER, DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST, and TINA PITTS PROVOST, hereafter named as defendants, did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other and with James Jacques Provost, now deceased, and with diverse other persons whose names are to the Grand Jury unknown, to violate the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

The object of the conspiracy was:

That the defendants and others would knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, in violation of the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

OVERT ACTS

1. In late August or early September, 1981, the exact date being to the Grand Jury unknown, PETER DAVID STISSER traveled from Apex, North Carolina, to Indiatlantic, Florida, and returned to North Carolina with 180 pounds of marijuana.

2. This marijuana was stored at the residence of DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST and TINA PITTS PROVOST at 204 Trails End, Raleigh, North Carolina.

3. On or about October 12, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," called TINA PITTS PROVOST and asked if she had any "smoke" at her house. TINA PITTS PROVOST responded, "just green stuff." TINA PITTS PROVOST commented that

"someone was supposed to come move some of this stuff over here, is anybody going to do that?; it's in the garage and it's all located in one corner." JACKSON asked if TINA PROVOST was going to leave that other smoke there and TINA responded, "Yes, you wanna get it? There's not a whole bunch there and it's not the greatest."

4. On or about the 12th day of October, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," told PETER DAVID STISSER that James Jacques Provost wanted everything out of the house and hidden in the bushes behind the house.

5. On the same day as in overt act no. 4 above, PETER DAVID STISSER told DONALD CHRISTOPHER PROVOST that they would move "the stuff" during half-time.

Said acts, and other overt acts both known and not known to the Grand Jury, being committed in the furtherance of said conspiracy to violate the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.

COUNT THREE

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1981, DARRYL STEPHEN PROVOST did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when he talked with James Jacques Provost by telephone about 5:09 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

COUNT FOUR

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 5th day of October, 1981, JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," and DONALD DOYLE NINES did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when they talked to each other by telephone about 7:32 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

COUNT FIVE

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 5th day of October, 1981, TERESA KLEAZER and JEFFREY CRAIG BUNGARDNER did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy

to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when they talked with JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," by telephone about 8:16 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

COUNT SIX

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 8th day of October, 1981, JAMES C. CODDINGTON did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (#919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when he talked with PETER DAVID STISSER by telephone at about 6:40 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

COUNT SEVEN

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1981, GARY J. FEED, a/k/a "George," did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (#919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when he talked to James Jacques Provost by telephone at about 3:46 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

COUNT EIGHT

21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)

That on or about the 12th day of October, 1981, TIMA PITTS PROVOST did knowingly and intentionally use a communication facility, that is, a telephone (#919-362-0216) located in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in facilitating the knowing, intentional, and unlawful conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute a Schedule I narcotic controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, a felony under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), when she talked to JAMES MAURICE JACKSON, a/k/a "Bubba," by telephone at about 3:50 p.m., in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b).

A TRUE BILL

SAMUEL T. CURRIEN
United States Attorney

BY: WALLACE W. DIXON
Assistant United States Attorney

FOREMAN
JURY
10-12-81

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PROOF OF SERVICE--CERTIFICATE BY BAR MEMBER

I, Christine Witcover Dean, the attorney for Teresa Eleazar, petitioner herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the 11th day of January, 1984, I served copies of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on the several parties thereto, as follows:

On the United States, by leaving a copy thereof at the office of Samuel T. Currin, Esq., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Federal Building, Raleigh, North Carolina, and by mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope, with postage prepaid, to The Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.

To: Samuel T. Currin, Federal Building, New Bern Avenue,
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

To: Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States,
U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530

Christine Witcover Dean

Christine Witcover Dean
Attorney for Petitioner
Post Office Box 667
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Telephone: (919) 828-9800

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PROOF OF MAILING--AFFIDAVIT


I, Christine Witcover Dean, the attorney for Teresa Eleazar, petitioner herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that on the 11th day of January, 1984, I deposited in a United States post office located at Raleigh, North Carolina, with first-class postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, within the time allowed for filing, the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Christine Witcover Dean
Christine Witcover Dean
Attorney for Petitioner

Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Raleigh,
North Carolina this 11th day of January, 1984.

Crystal W. Sailer
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: June 21, 1988



No. **83-6092**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

TERESA ELEAZAR, PETITIONER

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Now comes the Petitioner, by and through her undersigned court-appointed attorney and moves the Court by leave to proceed on her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, attached hereto, in forma pauperis, pursuant to Rule 46, Supreme Court Rules.

Petitioner applied to both the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to proceed in forma pauperis, which applications were granted. Petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel at the trial level. That attorney withdrew, and the undersigned was appointed for the appeal under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended.

Therefore, Petitioner contends that she is indigent and qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis.

RECEIVED

JAN 13 1984

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of January,
1984.

Christine Witcover Dean
Christine Witcover Dean
Attorney for Petitioner
Post Office Box 667
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
(919) 828-9800